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The Chinese Legalist Hanfei claimed that by separating the duties of the ruler as such from 
any moral claims attained to it, he made it possible for all rulers to apply “artifacts” for 
ruling. Ruling through moral superiority will fail because only few rulers will achieve it. 
Through the ruler running the “carefully oiled state machinery” as quasi-causal system, 
Hanfei claims to have developed a system of government suited even for the mediocre 
rulers.
This paper claims that Hanfei shifted the difficulty from the ethical to the practical 
level, not solving the problem. Moreover, by changing the level of the problem, he also 
faces some epistemic and metaphysic challenges. In short: the supposedly ideal system of 
government Hanfei claims to have developed fails. It fails especially because it is too difficult 
for the mediocre ruler, perhaps more difficult than the Confucian.
In the first section, the interpretation of Hanfei as a philosopher in the Daoist tradition 
will be briefly presented. In the second, Hanfei’s first—practical—difficulty will be exam-
ined; in the third, potential epistemic and metaphysic challenges will be shown.
This paper is about Chinese Legalism, more precisely, about the philoso-
pher Hanfei. Although there seems to be controversy about the use of the term, 
“legalism” (fajia 法家) is generally considered to have been the classical 
Chinese school of thought during the times of the Qin dynasty (221 to 206 BC), 
emphasizing the commanding aspect of laws as binding rules not only for the 
people, but also for the ruler—the laws’ releaser himself—and for the state. 
This might seem a contradiction to the usual cliché about Legalism and Hanfei. 
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In the book Hanfeizi, however, there are many arguments about the solidifica-
tion of the power of the ruler through the law. And in order for the law to 
work, it should bind everyone, even the ruler himself. This does not mean that 
the ruler cannot change the law—but it means that if a rule is made, the rule 
remains stable and applies equally to all, even to the ruler, until its change. The 
law itself, however, cannot be derived from the whims of the ruler, but has to be 
in accordance with the Way (dao 道 ). These aspects can be seen in the chapters 
5 (“The Dao of the Ruler”), 7 (“Wielding the Scepter”) and 53 (“Trimming the 
Laws” in the book of Hanfei”).1
Legalism—at least in its beginnings—can be considered a clear rupture 
from Confucianism as a notion of how to govern the state. Some scholars, how-
ever, do not consider legalism a philosophy, but rather a normative system to 
maintain and hold power (Goldin 2011). On the other hand, many aspects of 
legalistic thinking can be described in philosophic terms, and those were need-
ed to formulate the theory in the first place. While the main goal of legalism is 
to provide an instrument for the dominance of a country, the instrument itself 
has a philosophic dimension.
Legalism, instead of idealizing the past, as it claims Confucianism to do, 
takes the present and the future as main focus of its interest. It assumes the main 
task of the ruler to be uniting and pacifying his country. In parallel, the main 
task of the law is to provide the adequate mechanisms to deal with this desid-
eratum. For this, a system of law needs to be written down and implemented. 
Not virtues, but the bare law is claimed be the guiding principle of the state; 
this law should be enforced independently from the person or other possible 
sympathies. In this sense, legalism considers the law as a state-consequentialist 
instrument of government. Here, a special feature of legalism is made clear: the 
lack of justificatory motivation, at least for the use of the law as an instrument.
Hanfei ( 韓 非 , or: Han Fei, or: Han Fei Zi) and prior to him Shang Yang 
never took the trouble to find any justificatory explanation for the role of their 
states within their philosophical systems. Both are read, in a realistic context, as 
troubled by the apparent anarchy of their respective time and thus wanting to 
create order within a state, but in their works little is said about why “law” has 
to be the center of state-building. There are two similar interpretations of their 
respective motivations. The first claims order to be such a basic good and need, 
1 For the Dao-argument see Harris (2011) and for the stability of laws-argument see 
Schneider 2011.
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that it justifies the nature of the lawful state. The second interpretation claims 
that the state is as such a basic good and that it needs no further justification.2
This paper is concerned with a less practical and more philosophical read-
ing of Hanfei as advanced by Ivanhoe (2011). He sees the philosopher theoriz-
ing for a less-than-active monarch, a figure in the shadows that acts barely on 
the basis of short-term self-interest, because not acting may be in his long-term 
best interest. This poses a prima facie contradiction: while on the one hand 
Hanfei is supposed to argue for an almost almighty, strong state that ultimately 
controls every citizen, on the other hand he gives the monarch no power of this 
powerful state, constraining the ruler to an existence of abstention from power 
in order to maintain power.
“[The monarch] is caught in the iron cage of his own state ma-
chinery and dwells there in mysterious isolation, what Hanfei 
calls a “godlike” (shen 神) isolation. Arguably, this is not an 
unanticipated or unwelcome consequence but the very aim 
of Hanfeizi’s political philosophy: a system in which the state 
and not the individual—not even the ruler—is supreme.” 
(Ivanhoe 2011, 41).
While many, for example Cheng (1981) and (1983), already explored and 
shared Confucian and Daoist criticisms of Legalism, especially Hanfei, this pa-
per examines a complication within Hanfei’s conception of the ruler, the state 
and political power. The above, however, is not the only prima facie contradic-
tion to which the philosophical reading of Hanfei leads, there is also a second 
problem, a practical one: The Chinese Legalist claimed that by separating the 
duties of the ruler as such from any moral claims attached to it made it possible 
for all rulers to apply their instruments of government, i.e. laws, for ruling. 
Moral claims are majority-excluding, because only few rulers will fulfil them. 
Instrumental claims, however, are easier to handle, since they don’t impose a 
change in character or personality, they only require their application.
This paper adheres to Ivanhoe’s (2011) reading of Hanfei as a philosopher 
influenced by Daoism; but it claims that Hanfei merely shifted the difficulty 
from the ethical to the practical level, not solving the problem as such. More-
over, by changing the level of the problem, he also faces some epistemic and 
2 Sometimes, in the context of Hanfei, chapter 59 of the Hanfeizi is mentioned. There 
is a reading of that chapter making the case for the increase of order benefiting the people 
(see Schneider, 2013).
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metaphysic challenges. In the first section, the reading of Hanfei as influenced 
by Daoism will be briefly presented. In the second, Hanfei’s first—practical—
difficulty will be examined. In the third, potential epistemic and metaphysic 
challenges will be discussed.
On the one hand, this paper is concerned with the philosophy of Hanfei. 
On the other hand, this subject has a distinct relevance for research in today’s 
context, since it sees the Chinese philosopher as a social scientist, and as such 
takes on a modern claim of epistemic and pragmatic separation of government 
and morality.
1. Hanfei: A Philosopher Within the Daoist Tradition?
Ivanhoe’s (2011) reading of Hanfei claims that Hanfei is influenced by Dao-
ism. Two of these influences should be highlighted: First, Hanfei’s dismissal of 
the Confucian tradition, especially of its pursuit of moral self-cultivation and 
moral advancement (most eloquently in the chapters 50 and 51 of the Han-
feizi), and second, the idea of non-action as central and applicable to the ruler’s 
instrument of governing (especially seen in chapters 5, 6, and 7 of Hanfeizi).3
This reading of Hanfei in the light of Ivanhoe (2011) may be sketched as 
follows. Hanfei took human nature to be on average self-interested and me-
diocre. To expect people and rulers to live up to highest moral standards is 
more than just careless, it is dangerous for the state, since it diverts the ruler’s 
attention from what is important towards the unreachable. The idea of moral 
self-cultivation of the ruler has to fail, according to Hanfei, due to two factors: 
First, the active pursuit of morality normally leads to its opposite, because of 
the egoistic nature of man; and second, the ruler cultivates his practical means 
of government, first and foremost his persona—his image.
Hanfei’s ruler rules through his persona. Persona here is meant to be a sort 
of well-crafted image that results from functioning state machinery and the 
non-action of the ruler therein. The monarch is able to remain in non-action, 
because the machinery of his state is so well constructed and maintained that 
it hums along and achieves its ends without any need for effort on his part. 
His role is to stay behind the scenes and see to it that things continue to run 
smoothly. Hanfei’s ruler is a shadowy presence. If he has any “virtue” at all it 
3 Other Daoist ideas, most strikingly moral-self-cultivation, did not influence Hanfei.
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is the authority he exercises by being “unreadable”, i.e. incomprehensible and 
non-predictable and an unwavering source of reward and punishment.
While I agree somewhat with Ivanhoe (2011), this reading of Hanfei points 
towards a dilemma within the Legalist’s concept of the ideal ruler: On the one 
hand, Hanfei sets the goal of his philosophy as providing a ruler with the ulti-
mate means for controlling power within the state. On the other hand, in order 
for the ruler to implement Hanfei’s teachings, he must beware those who try 
to influence him in any capacity. This requires him to cut himself off, not only 
from his ministers but also from his friends and family. He cannot support their 
aims or desires, for by doing so, he would be revealing his own preferences, 
and this information is an opportunity for others to gain advantage or influence 
over him. At least emotionally and practically, he must live in complete isola-
tion. He cannot even openly acknowledge or pursue the things he likes or avoid 
things he dislikes, as knowledge of his preferences can be used against him.
According to this logic, the ruler must act as if he were deeply alienated 
from everything he likes or dislikes. Moreover, since the ruler has not to act 
directly but rather let the machinery of his institutions govern, he is largely su-
perfluous; he is not an active and controlling executive but rather a figurehead 
or symbol for the state. As Ivanhoe (2011, 121) puts it: “In the end, the ruler is 
reduced to being a kind of phantom oiler of the vast state machinery.”
The ruler’s main task is to represent the power and authority of the state 
and to ensure that no one or no coalition disrupts it. It is his position and careful-
ly crafted persona—not his personality or character or even charisma—that com-
mands this authority. If freedom is the state of being unconstrained and power 
the ability to act as one desires, then the ideal Legalist ruler seems to have no 
real freedom or power.
2. Hanfei’s Problems
By endorsing Ivanhoe’s reading of Hanfei, several problems arise within the 
Legalist’s philosophy. In this chapter, three main topics will be discussed: mini-
mal psychological realism; the question whether handling rules of behavior is 
necessarily easier than moral self-cultivation, and the problem of how to know 
which rules, or laws, to employ.
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2.1 Minimal Psychological Realism
Owen Flanagan, in his book Varieties of Moral Personality (1991), explores 
the minimal criteria necessary for the moral possibilities for human self-evalu-
ation and develops his main principle. The “Principle of Minimal Psychological 
Realism” (PMPR) is defined as follows: “Make sure when constructing a moral 
theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, and 
behaviour prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures 
like us” (Flanagan 1991: 32). Although not intending to establish the detailed 
content of a correct moral theory, Flanagan claims that the PMPR can set the 
minimal criteria for evaluating the potentialities of a moral system in light of 
the material and cognitive realities of human psychology. This enables the phi-
losopher to begin to think about moral systems that might accommodate what 
is known empirically about human nature; theories that clash with such knowl-
edge need to be reconsidered or rejected.
Applied to the discussion here, minimal psychological realism claims that 
every normative mental state can be achieved by an average of those under 
the normative constraint. It is arguable whether partial or complete alien-
ation from one’s personal likes and dislikes is something the average ruler can 
achieve. Furthermore, due to the signals and nudges a potentially absolute ruler 
is exposed to, it is even more difficult to argue that a mediocre monarch can 
detach himself from his desires. Flanagan discusses Hanfei’s system falling short 
of fulfilling PMPR in (2011).
Furthermore, Hanfei does not consider the self-alienation of the ruler as a 
normative postulate in the sense of ethics. Rather, for Hanfei, it is an artefact of 
government, i.e. something that has to be applied when governing, and hence 
something every ruler can and must apply.
2.2 The shift from ethics to the pragmatic level
Possibly, Hanfei’s philosophy can also be challenged via practical consider-
ations. The Legalist claims—correctly—that changing one’s behaviour is easier 
than changing one’s nature. However, the initial assumption is the self-inter-
ested nature of man, which also applies to the average ruler, who is a member 
of the human species. Furthermore, there is also the danger of not only self-
interested behaviour by the ruler, but a possible propensity to be mediocre.
Hanfei takes his initial argument, i.e. his assumptions, to be sound enough 
to refute moral self-cultivation. In the context of this reading, the Legalist can 
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make his argument. Here, Hanfei separates the normative from the factual and 
applies a “social-scientific” principle. It may be that the ruler ought to be a 
moral role model, as Confucianism states; but he is not, and history has shown 
that, more often times than not, rulers are neither sages nor junzi. In this sense, 
Hanfei opts for giving the rulers laws or instruments of government, best mate-
rialized as “rules of behaviour”, i.e. governing by his persona, alienating himself, 
punishing and rewarding. Hanfei seems to assume that these rules can easily be 
followed and adopted by every ruler.
This might impose a difficulty on the interpretation of Hanfei’s first thesis 
concerning the self-interested and mediocre nature of man. In other words, 
the Legalist seems to assume that the self-interested ruler with a propensity 
to mediocrity will at the same time fail cultivating himself morally, but nev-
ertheless succeed in cultivating his persona and handling the “instruments” of 
government or laws (i.e. he will succeed in oiling the machine, to borrow from 
Ivanhoe’s claim).
Hanfei’s argument is that moral self-cultivation is impossible, but cultivat-
ing a persona and handling the instruments of government are necessary and 
possible. Since the discussion about handling the state is not about difficulties, 
but rather about possibilities, the last argument may by re-stated as a ques-
tion to Hanfei: Why does the monarch fail in ethics but succeed in practical 
handling? Or: Why does the monarch who fails in morally cultivating himself 
succeed in practically cultivating his persona?
Schematically developed, Hanfei’s arguments and problems run as follows:
A. The erroneous argument (often made by Confucianism).
A1. Moral self-cultivation is the overall goal of people.
A2. The average person is self-interested, and rulers are, 
on average, not better than the average citizen.
A3. Self-interest is contrary to moral self-cultivation.
A4. Therefore, it is impossible or at least improbable, that 
rulers will achieve a reasonable level of morality, even 
with self-cultivation.
B. The correct, Legalist alternative.
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B1. Instead of moral self-cultivation, the ruler has to apply 
“rules of behaviour” or instruments of government, i.e. 
laws.
B2. The ruler can apply the rules of behaviour, because these 
are made for him and serve his personal self-interest.
This line of argumentation is sound, but has two problems: The first is another 
principle of human nature acknowledged by Hanfei, i.e. mediocrity, and the 
second is self-interest in itself. In raising another claim, a severe problem arises 
within B:
B3. In order to fully apply the rules of behaviour, the ruler 
has to be alienated from his own desires.
If the ruler is detached from whatever he likes and dislikes, if he is alienated 
from his self-interest, why should he then use the instruments Hanfei proposes? 
Or: If the ruler has no reason to rule at all; why should he have a reason to be 
the ruler. This aspect will be developed in more detail later.
A closer examination of these two problems reveals that more challenges 
arise. Hanfei also states that at least some rulers, if not the average ruler, are 
self-interested and mediocre. This is especially problematic with regard to B2, 
which presupposes the ability of the ruler to adhere to the “rules of behaviour” 
and skilfully implement them. Compare the old and new scheme:
A1. Moral self-cultivation is to be achieved.
A2’. The average person (including rulers) is self-interested 
and mediocre.
A3’. Self-interest and mediocrity are contrary to moral self-
cultivation.
A4. Therefore, it is impossible or at least highly improb-
able, that rulers will achieve a reasonable level of mo-
rality, even with self-cultivation.
B1. Instead of moral self-cultivation, the ruler has to apply 
“rules of behaviour”.
B2’. The ruler can try to apply the rules of behaviour, be-
cause they are made for him and serve his personal self-
interest; however, as he is on average mediocre, there is 
no guarantee of success in applying them.
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B3. In order to fully apply the rules of behaviour, the ruler 
has to be alienated from his own desires.
B4. The regulatory system imposed by the rules is always 
challenged by his mediocrity and therefore inherently 
unstable.
B5. Therefore, the problem of the ideal ruler persists: HF 
refuses the idea of an ethically-ideal ruler, but seems to 
presuppose a practically-skilled one.
2.3. Epistemology and change
B3, as stated above, seems to detach the ruler from his own desires and 
requires him not to show any interest, since this piece of information can be 
used against him. However, how can the ruler manage change, if he is neither al-
lowed to express his desires or to ask for information? To put it differently, how 
is the ruler to adapt the rules of behaviour to change? To take this a step further, 
even if the ruler is “allowed” to change rules, there is no guarantee that he will 
succeed in adapting the government to changes or challenges, since mediocrity 
takes effect again.
Examining this problem, Hanfei seems to use the principle of “non-action” 
as a corrective. The ruler who remains in non-action allows for a more careful 
analysis of the change without having to modify the machinery of the state or 
having to issue new laws. But here again, the nature of man strikes back: Self-
interest is taken above to make the ruler strong, since it is presupposed that by 
remaining still and adhering to non-action, the long-term preferences of the 
monarch will be better served.
But there is also short-term self-interest, and this, summed to mediocrity, 
makes non-action improbable. Therefore, non-action is not necessarily in the 
interest of self-interested rulers, and the long-term perspective would also be 
part of the “rules of behaviour”. In this case, at least some desires are to be al-
lowed—but then again, there are no guarantees for long-term thinking, since 
every monarch can yield to mediocrity. Even if Hanfei would be interpreted as 
“just” arguing against short-termism in the ruler’s thought, the problem per-
sists: the self-interested, mediocre ruler will indulge his short-term interests 
and there is nothing in Hanfei’s system to stop it from happening.
On a second and more substantial level, if the ruler is supposed to detach 
himself from his self-interest, is he then required to alienate himself from the 
10 Auslegung 32/1
epistemic conditions that lead him to recognize whatever challenges his self-
interests? Knowledge bases on directing one’s attention to issues; the process 
of directing one’s interest presupposes some sort of self-interest in order to 
prioritize what is important. Therefore, the ruler will have to promote his self-
interest somewhat, even if it is the self-interest of the state, which in turn is 
congruent with the self-interest of the ruler, in order to direct his attention 
to the relevant topics. Self-interest is part of the epistemic capabilities of the 
monarch and necessary for his overall success.
These epistemic capabilities do not only allow the ruler to oil the state 
machinery by recognizing what has to be done, they make it possible for the 
ruler to use the two handles of the state, punishment and reward. They also en-
able him to observe and recognize the changing contexts of the state, and the 
emerging issues the state needs to address. These very same epistemic condi-
tions that arise from self-interest make it possible for the ruler to comply with 
the Dao.
In Chapter V, Hanfei acknowledges:
“Dao is the beginning of the myriad things, the standard of 
right and wrong. That being so, the intelligent ruler, by hold-
ing to the beginning, knows the source of everything, and, by 
keeping to the standard, knows the origin of good and evil. 
Therefore, by virtue of resting empty and reposed, he waits 
for the course of nature to enforce itself, so that all names 
will be defined of themselves and all affairs will be settled 
of themselves. Empty, he knows the essence of fullness; 
reposed, he becomes the corrector of motion. Who utters a 
word creates himself a name; who has an affair creates him-
self a form. Compare forms and names, and see if they are 
identical. Then the ruler will find nothing to worry about, as 
everything is reduced to its reality.”
Here, Hanfei makes two crucial points: First, he clarifies that the ruler is 
more than just a passive absorber of the Dao; even if he remains in non-action, 
he is actively immersed in the Dao. Therein, the ruler has epistemic capabilities, 
even duties; it is through knowing that he is able to remain in non-action. If he 
lacked knowledge, he would be led to action, therefore disrupting the system. 
From this follows that in order to “comply” with the Dao, the ruler has to be 
able to achieve some sort of knowledge. For this, he needs likes and dislikes, 
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desires and interests. On the other hand, the ruler himself is required to detach 
himself from these.
The same problem is imposed on a practical level. In Chapter 52, Hanfei 
claims:
“The intelligent sovereign confers ranks and bounties accord-
ing to merits and assigns offices and tasks in correspondence 
with abilities. Therefore, the persons appointed always have 
worthy qualities; those taken into service always have re-
quired abilities. If worthy and able men are in governmental 
service, all requests by private clans will disappear. Indeed, 
if men of merit receive great bounties and men of ability at-
tain high offices, then private swordsmen will infallibly stop 
their self-seeking bravery and attack public enemies. So will 
the itinerant politicians stop handing around the private resi-
dences of influential clans and start striving for purity and 
cleanliness. This is the way to gather the worthy and able men 
and scatter the dependents of influential clans.”
Here too, the ruler has the “duty” to recognize merits and qualities. In order to 
do so, he has to be guided by some sort of interest, which, as a sovereign, is his 
self-interest. Then again, mediocrity always challenges the skills of the ruler.
3. Epistemic and metaphysical problems
The considerations mentioned in the section above lead to other questions 
relating to the reading of Hanfei as a Daoist. Since the Legalist thinks about the 
role of the monarch in a man-crafted state, he is apparently considering facets 
of the social dao, which is normative and changeable. Does this automatically 
imply that Hanfei does not take natural dao or the great dao, which are factual 
and constant, into consideration?
Nature does not authorize or endorse any particular dao. This means that 
a particular one is compatible with many or none. Leaving this aside, Hanfei 
directs his interest to dealing with the ever-changing social dao. In this sense, he 
moves away from epistemology and metaphysics towards practical-philosophy 
and social science. However, his system is still “loaded” with Daoistic philoso-
phy. Especially his choice of fa (law, standard) as a guiding principle that is pri-
marily focused on language is important. Laws are made of words, but fa—as 
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opposed to the usual meaning of law—could work in order to bridge words 
and dao.
Since words are not constant, no dao that can be conveyed using words can 
be constant. However, what is being denied by denying the constancy of the 
social dao? Using the very core of legalistic thinking, fa, the standard, does not 
only apply to the law. In fact, using fa as the law is just one—and probably not 
the best—mode of fa, which also means standard, technique, or system. It is 
also the standard guiding the interpretation of language and of nature’s intent 
(tian). A very basic and constant standard, which is shared by Daoism and Legal-
ism, is the basic distinction between benefit and harm. In fact, Legalism bases 
its own method using this standard transformed to law.
As applying to the ruler’s choice and remembering the introductive words 
of the Daodejing, there is no correct way that many are discerned solely by 
the intent of subjective wonderings. Even first-order observation of nature 
would not lead to the recognition of the constant dao. And especially, no social 
practice determines what concrete behaviour counts as correct in the here and 
now. One of the reasons for this is that human dao is enshrined in language. 
Language, however, is a construction and as such. And again remembering the 
Daodejing, whatever can be constructed is not the dao as such (“Dao that can be 
dao-ed is not the constant dao”).
This leaves Hanfei with just one option for solving at least the last problem 
concerned with the knowledge of the ruler. The issue is that a ruler without 
self-interest or a monarch who is not able to direct his intention to anything 
determinate loses his epistemic capabilities to recognize the dao—or at least to 
recognize changes in nature leading to further challenges for the state.
This reading is consistent with the Hanfeizi and with Ivanhoe’s (2011) in-
terpretation of Hanfei within the Daoist tradition. In fact, this reading leads to 
a better understanding of why the ruler remains is a “godlike” isolation while 
trying to fulfil his mandate.
4. Conclusions
This paper examines three important challenges to the Hanfei’s philosophy 
that come from within his own system:
1. Based on his conception of the nature of man as self-
interested and mediocre, Hanfei dismisses moral self-
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cultivation: Why should the self-interested and mediocre 
ruler who is not able to achieve ethical fullness be able to 
skillfully use the two handles of the state?
2. The ruler is supposed to alienate himself from his own 
desires, likes, and dislikes. Is this claim compatible with 
minimal psychological realism?
3. How can a ruler who alienates himself from his interests 
be epistemically able to immerse himself in the Dao?
This paper gives a first overview of the emerging issues and tries to solve the 
third problem by drawing on the Daoistic philosophy to interpret the fa as a 
standard for bridging language and tian-dao. Another possible solution, espe-
cially for the first and the second issues, is to interpret Hanfei’s legalism as a 
systematic philosophy in which the analysis of a single problem isn’t possible, 
but challenges are to be dealt with by comparing them with the whole behav-
iour of the system. Megalopolitika—a created concept referring to Aristotle—is 
one solution that could to be explored.
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